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JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from the 30 November 1995, JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL p u r s u a n t to Respondent's 2 October 1995, MOTION TO DISMISS,
the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, presiding.
Pursuant to the granting of Respondent's pre-answer MOTION TO
DISMISS from the District Court below, Petitioner appeals to the Utah Court
of Appeals, which has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the
Utah Judicial Code. U.C.A. §78-2(a)-3(2)(a), also Article 8 Section 5, Utah State
Constitution.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
POINT # 1 . DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS? IN OTHER
WORDS, WAS PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A. REQUEST DENIALS FATALLY
FLAWED?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review considered under a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, is that all reasonable inferences made with regard to
the original complaint (PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A.
REQUEST DENIALS, in this case) and the facts alleged are to be construed as true
and considered in a light most favorable to the Petitioner.
1.
2.
3.
3.

FREEGARD v. FIRST W. NATL BANK 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987)
MOUNTEER v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991)
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS INC. ETAL. V. VIRGINIA ETAL.. 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
SOC Y OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR.
616F.Supp. 569 (D.Utah 1985)

3 . THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS v. BRIGGS ETAL..
675 F.Supp 1308 (D.Utah 1987)

POINT #2. DOES THE UTAH GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS AND
MANAGEMENT ACT. U.CA. §63-2-101 ETSEQ, IDENTIFY,
DEFINE, OR EVEN CONTEMPLATE "NON-RECORDS?"
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue on review is governed by the clear and plain language of the
statute and the statutes' definition of the term "non-record." This review is
an issue of first impression by an appellate court in Utah. Statutes and
appellate court decisions which may bear influence on the issues under
review might include:
1. Utah Code Annotated. §63-2-101 etseq., [Governmental Records Access
and Management Act (G. JR. A. M. A.)]
2. Washington Countu Ordinance. #529 et seq.

POINT #3. DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY APPLY U. C. A. §63-2103(18)(b)(v9 TO PETITIONER'S CASE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue on review is governed by the clear and plain language of the
statute and the application of U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(a) in contradistinction
to U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) as applied to Petitioner's case This review is
an issue of first impression by an appellate court in Utah. Statutes and
appellate court decisions which may bear influence on the issues under
review might include:
1.
2.
3.
4.

U. C. A.
U. C. A.
U. C. A.
U.CA.

§63-2-103(17)
§63-2-103(18)(a)
§63-2-103(18)(b)(vi)
§63-2-201(2)
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POINT #4. CAN PETITIONER BE EXPECTED OR OBLIGATED BY HIS
GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL BEYOND THE GEOGRAPHIC
BOUNDARIES OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH HE LIVES, IN
ORDER FOR HIM TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE RECORDS
HE SEEKS. IN OTHER WORDS, IS THERE AN ISSUE OF
CONVENIENCE AT PLAY TO DENY PETITIONER ACCESS
TO THE RECORDS HE SEEKS?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review considered under a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, is that all reasonable inferences made with regard to the
original complaint (a PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A. REQUEST
DENIALS in this case) are to be construed as true and in a light most favorable to
the Petitioner.
1. MOUNTEER v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY. 823 P,2d 1055 (Utah 1991)
2 . SOCIETY OF PROF. JOURNALISTS v. BRIGGS. 675 F.Supp 1308 (D.Utah 1987)
3 . RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS INC. ETAL. V. VIRGINIA ETAL.. 448 U.S. 555 (1980)

VERBATIM RECITALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Constitution. Article 8, Section 5
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited
by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The
district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall
be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court
with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6)
(b) how presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party.

<.
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Utah Code Annotated 63-2-103(17)
"Public record" means a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that
is not exempt from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b).

Utah Code Annotated 63-2-103(18)(a)
"Record" means all books, letters, documents, papers, maps, plans, photographs,
films, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data, or other documentary materials
regardless of physical form or characteristics;

Utah Code Annotated 63-2-103(18)(b)(vi)
(b) "Record" does not mean:
(vi) books and other materials that are cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and
contained in the collections of libraries open to the public, regardless of physical
form or characteristics of the material;

Utah Code Annotated 63-2-201(2)
All records are public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute.

Utah Code Annotated 63-2-20l(3)(b)
(3) The following records are not public;
(b) records to which access is restricted pursuant to court rule, another state statute,
federal statute, or federal regulation, including records for which access is
governed or restricted as a condition of participation in a state or federal program
or for receiving state or federal funds.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner sought Judicial review of Respondent's denial of access to
public records pursuant to the Utah Government Records Access and
Management Act (G. R. A. M. A.), U.CA. §63-2-101 et seq, also Washington
Countu Ordinance #529 et seq.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
1. On 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14 August 1995, Petitioner/Appellant physically
attempted to gain access to and review certain public records housed at the
Washington County Attorney's Office in St. George, Utah. (Record, pages 2
thru 5)
Court of Appeals Case No. 960021 CA — APPELLANT'S R B I C C

2.

On 9 August 1995, Petitioner submitted a written G. R. A. M. A.

request to the custodian of the records of the Washington County Attorneys'
Office, which was denied by Eric Ludlow, by letter on 16 August 1995.
(Record, page 5, f #31)
3.

On 11 August 1995, pursuant to the in person denials of 8, 9, 10, &

11 August 1995, and pursuant to Washington County Ordinance No. 529, at 1
10(B)(1), Petitioner filed an administrative appeal to the Washington County
Commission. (Record, pages 2 thru 6, f S #1, #4, #11, #12, #21, #22, #24,
#25, & #34)
4.

Twenty-One (21) days then passed without the County Commission

responding to Petitioner's administrative appeal, and Petitioner sought remedy
in District Court for judicial review of the Washington Countys' denials of
Petitioner's G. R. A. M. A. Requests, on 8 September 1995. (Record, page 6,
<J #34 and Record, page 1)
5.

Respondent/Appellee was served the SUMMONS and PETITION on

12 September 1995, by one (1) Gary Stubbs, a local process server. (Record,
page 11)
6.

The RETURN OF SERVICE was filed with the Fifth Judicial District

Court on 14 September 1995. (Record, page 12)
7.

On or about 2 October 1995, Respondent caused to be filed its

MOTION TO DISMISS, arguing that the documents sought by the Petitioner
were "non-records" "subject to GRAMA." (Record, page 17)
8.

On 3 October 1995, the District Court entered a DEFAULT

CERTIFICATE against the Respondent. (Record, page 13)
9.

On 11 October 1995, Petitioner filed his OPPOSITION TO

RESPONDENTS MOTION TO DISMISS. (Record, page 43)

10.

On 11 October 1995, Petitioner filed his MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT. (Record, page 6, <R #48)
11.

On 23 October 1995, Petitioner filed a NOTICE TO SUBMIT on

Respondents' MOTION TO DISMISS. (Record, page
12.

57)

On 23 October 1995, Petitioner filed a NOTICE TO SUBMIT on his

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Record, page
13.

59)

On 26 October 1995, Petitioner caused an AFFIDAVIT OF

PREJUDICE to be filed against Judge G. Rand Beacham. (Record, page
14.

On 13 November 1995, the Court issued a n ORDER CERTIFYING

AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE TO JUDGE J . PHILIP EVES. (Record, page
15.

61)

142)

On 15 November 1995, Respondent caused to be filed its MOTION

TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.
(Record, pages 64 & 66
16.

respectively)

On 17 November 1995, Respondent caused to be filed its

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS [sic] NOTICE TO SUBMIT THE MOTION TO
DISMISS; AND MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO ACCEPT REPLY
MEMORANDUM, DEFENDANTS' [sic] REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS, and SECOND NOTICE TO SUBMIT MOTION TO
DISMISS. (Record, pages 91, 94, & 139
17.

respectively)

On 17 November 1995, Respondent also caused to be filed its

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S [sic] NOTICE TO SUBMIT THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DEFENDANTS [sic] RULE 56(f) MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S [sic] MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS [sic]
RULE 56 (f) MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO
PLAINTIFF'S [sic] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, and AFFIDAVIT OF
3RUCE M. PRITCHETT, JR. (Record, pages 78, 81, 83, &, 88
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respectively)

18. On 22 November 1995, the Court entered its RULING regarding
Petitioner's 26 October 1995, AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE, denying Petitioner's
effort to recuse Judge Beacham. (Record, page 143)
19. On 30 November 1995, the Court below rendered its JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL, which was caused to be mailed to the Petitioner on 1 December
1995.

(Record, page 147)
20. On 3 January 1995, Petitioner filed his NOTICE OF APPEAL in this

matter. (Record, page 153)

Statement of the Facts
1.

On Tuesday, 8 August 1995, at approximately 8:30 am.,

Petitioner attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the Washington
County Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, Utah, to exercise
his 1st Amendment Right to access to public documents contained at that
location. (Record, page 2 5 #Ij
2.

There is a new partition built in the reception area of the County

Attorney's Office, with a locked door blocking access to the Law Library.
(Record, page 2 <fl #2)
3.

Upon discovering the blocked access to the Law Library,

Petitioner asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1) who was sitting there, for
access to the Law Library. This constitutes Petitioner's first (1st), in person,
G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Record, page 2 <J #3)
4.

The receptionist informed Petitioner that the Law Library was no

longer available or open to the public, and she made no effort to offer or
allow him beyond the door blocking access. (Record, page 2 <J #4)
• -

• •*
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5.

Petitioner requested to speak to someone with more authority than

her and asked the receptionist to get someone else for him to speak to.
(Record, page 2 q #5)
6.

Jane Doe #1 left the reception area and went back into the office

area, beyond Petitioner's view. A secretary for one of the attorneys returned
(Jane Doe #2)) and informed Petitioner that the Law Library was not public, it
was for the exclusive use of the Washington County attorneys. (Record, page

2q#6)
7.

Jane Doe #2 informed Petitioner that all the Law books and

information he desired to review or obtain could be found at the Washington
County Public Library over on Main Street. She also stated that all the law
books contained in the Law Library at the Washington County Attorneys office
were contained on CD's (compact disc) for use on the computer terminals at
the Public Library. (Record, page 2 q #7)
8.

Petitioner asked to speak to Eric Ludlow, and was informed that he

was not there. Petitioner asked to speak to any other attorney in the office and
was informed they were all over at the courthouse. (Record, page 3 q #8)
9.

As of 8 August 1995, at approximately 10:30 am. there were no law

books or legal reference books available on CD or by any other media at the
Washington County Library, on Main Street, in St. George, Utah. Jane Doe
#2's representation to Petitioner was a lie and therefore a fraud. (Record,
page 3 q #9)
10. The above facts stated i n l l t t l through #9, constituted Petitioner's
irst (1st) G. R. A. M. A. request denial by the Washington County Attorney's
Dffice. (Record, page 3 q #10)
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11. On Wednesday, 9 August 1995, at approximately 8:45 am.,
Petitioner again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the
Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George,
Utah, to exercise his 1st Amendment Right to access to public documents
contained at that location. (Record, page 3 <fl #11)
12. Petitioner again asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1} who was sitting
there, for access to the Law Library. The receptionist informed Petitioner that the
Law Library was not available or open to the public, and she made no effort to
offer or allow him beyond the door blocking access. This constitutes Petitioner's
second (2nd), in person, G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Recordf page 3 <f #12)
13. On first entering the County Attorney's Office, Brent Langston, an
Assistant Washington County Attorney, had just preceded Petitioner into the
office, by about 30 seconds. While Petitioner waited for the receptionist to
answer a call from the back, he could hear Brent Langston conversing with
others in back and out of view from the reception area. (Record, page 3 <fl #13)
14. Petitioner then asked Jane Doe #1 for her name, and she asked
him to repeat his question. Petitioner again asked her for her name and she
refused to give it to him. (Record, page 3 <f #14)
15. Petitioner informed Jane Doe #1 that she was a public servant
and she again refused to give him her name. (Record, page 4 <J #15)
16. Petitioner asked to speak to Eric Ludlow and Jane Doe #1
informed him that Ludlow was not there. (Record, page 4% #16)
17. Petitioner asked to speak to any attorney that was there and
Jane Doe #1 advised him that there were no attorney's in the building.
(Record, page 4<fl#17)

18. Petitioner informed Jane Doe #1 that he had just seen Brent
Langston enter the building, and Jane Doe #1 responded that he had left.
(Less than 2 minutes had expired since Petitioner entered the Office.)
Petitioner again insisted to speak to an attorney and Jane Doe #1 responded
that all the attorneys were over at the courthouse. Jane Doe #1 lied to
Petitioner in two (2) instances. (Record, page 4 <fl #18)
19. Petitioner immediately went to the courthouse and no attorneys
were there. He check the foyer and the courtrooms and all were empty.
(Record, page 4<fl#19)
20. The above facts stated in IS #11 through #19, constituted
Petitioner's second (2nd) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 4 <f #20)
21. On Thursday, 10 August 1995, at approximately 9:00 am., Petitioner
again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the Washington County
Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, Utah, to exercise his 1st
Amendment Right to access to public documents contained at that location.
(Record, page 4 <$ #21)
22. Petitioner asked the secretary (Jane Doe #3) who was standing there,
for access to the Law Library. The secretary informed Petitioner that the Law
Library was not available or open to the public, and she made no effort to offer
or allow him beyond the door blocking access. This constitutes Petitioner's
third (3rd), in person, G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Record, page 4 q #22)
23. The above facts stated in I I #21 & #22, constituted Petitioner's
third (3rd) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 4 q #23)
24. On Friday, 11 August 1995, at approximately 8:45 am., Petitioner
again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the Washington County
tttorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, Utah, to exercise his 1st
Court of Appeals Case Nn Qfinn9i P A — A o n e . . **—.

Amendment Right to access to public documents contained at that
location. (Record9 page 5 <fl #24)
25. Petitioner asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1) who was sitting there,
for access to the Law Library. She shook her head "no." Petitioner asked her for
her name and she again refused to give it to him. (Record9 page 5 <f #25j
26. Jana Mock then stepped into view from behind the partition and
informed Petitioner that she was only doing as instructed and that the Law
Library was not available to him for use. This constitutes Petitioner's
fourth (4th), in person, G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Record, page 5 5 #26)
27. The above facts stated in TI #24 through #26, constituted
Petitioner's fourth (4th) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 5 % #27)
28. On Monday, 14 August 1995, at approximately 9:30 am.,
Petitioner again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the
Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George,
Utah, to exercise his 1st Amendment Right to access to public documents
contained at that location. (Record, page 5 <f #28)
29. Petitioner asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1) who was sitting
there, for access to the Law Library. She shook her head "no." Petitioner
asked her for her name and she again refused to give it to him. (Record,
page 5 q #29)
30. The above facts stated in OT #28 & #29, constituted Petitioner's
fifth (5th) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 5 <fl #30)
31. On 9 August 1995, Petitioner submitted a written G. R. A. M. A.
request to the custodian of the records of the Washington County
Attorney's Office, which was denied by Eric Ludlow, by letter on 16 August
1995. (Record, page 5 q #31)

32. The description of the records sought to be inspected include, but
are not limited to: United States Code: Pacific Reporter, all volumes; Pacific
Reporter 2nd. Vol's. 1 through the present; Pacific Reporter Digest. 1st, 2nd, &
3rd editions; American Jurisprudence, all volumes; Words and Phrases, all
volumes; Corpus Juris Secundum, all volumes; American Law Review. 1st, 2nd,
3rd, 4th, & Federal editions, all volumes; Utah Law Review, all volumes;
Federal Reports, all volumes, U. S. Reports. Lawyer's edition, all volumes;
Black's Law Dictionary: and any other reference material, book, or periodical
maintained in the Law Library or any attorneys' offices housed at the Washington County Attorney's Office at the above address. (Record, page 6 <f #32)
33. The Law Library in question remains open to "licensed" attorneys,
establishing a special class of persons in Utah, and violating the provisions of
establishment of a title of nobility. (Record, page 6 <f #33)
34. On 11 August 1995, pursuant to Washington County Ordinance No.
529, at f 10(B)(1), Petitioner filed an administrative appeal to the Washington
County Commission. After twenty-one (21) days passed, Petitioner petitioned
the District Court for judicial review of the Washington County's denials of his
G. R. A. M. A. Requests. (Record, page 6 5f #34)
35. The Law Library at the Washington County Attorney's Office at 178
No. 200 East, in St. George, Utah, has traditionally been open to the public.
(Record, page 6 <R #35)
36. The Petitioner in this cause of action has used the Law Library at
the Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 No. 200 East, in St. George,
Utah, since September 1989, establishing a tradition of six (6) years of
exercising his constitutional right of free access, pursuant to the 1st and 14th
amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (Record, page 6 <3 #36)
Court of Appeals Case No. 960021 CA — APPPi I AMT'O r>«.^-

37. It is necessary and imperative that Petitioner have free access to
the Law Library at the Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 No. 200
East, in St. Gorge, Utah, as to deprive him of such also denies him his
constitutional right of self representation to the various lawsuits (including
this one) he presently has pending. (Record, page 7 <J[ #37j
38. It is entirely unreasonable for the Washington County Attorney
to expect the Petitioner, who is indigent, to travel outside Washington
County, to Utah County, Salt Lake County, and even outside Utah to a
foreign state, namely Nevada, to exercise his rights to free access of public
documents and self representation of his law suits. (Record, page 7 <fl #38)
39. Judge Beacham, presiding in the Court below, asserts in his 30
November 1995, JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that Petitioner failed to meet
the requirement of Rule 56, suggesting an improper or absence of supporting
affidavit. (Record, page 148, last

paragraph)

40. Judge Beacham, ruled in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that
Respondent's MOTION TO DISMISS, was "clearly a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted."
(Record, page 149, first

paragraph)

41. Judge Beacham found in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that
the term "public documents", are not defined in G. R. A. M. A. (Record,
page 150, first

paragraph)

42. The "GRAMA" Judge Beacham refers to is presumed to mean the
Utah Government Records Access and Management Act. U. C. A. §63-2-101 et
seq. (Not in Record)
43. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(a) defines "Record" to
mean all "books, letters, documents. [etc.T Therefore, a "document" is a

"record" and Petitioner's use of the word "document" is no different than if he
were to use the word "record." The words "document" and "record" are
synonymous. (Not in Record)
44. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(17) defines "public record" to
mean "a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that is not
exempt from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b). [Subsection
63-2-201 (3)(b) is not applicable in this particular case.] (Not in Record)
45. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-201(2) also states that, "All records
are public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute." (Not in Record)
46. Judge Beacham, referencing G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2103(18)(b)(vi) ruled in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that "The fatal flaw in
the Petition is that books [which were records Petitioner sought to inspect] are
not records to which GRAMA applies." (Record, page 149, first

paragraph)

47. As indicated in <I #43, above, G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2103(18)(a) defines "Record" to mean all "books, [etc.f Therefore, Judge
Beacham's ruling in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, is in error. (Not in
Record)
48. "Non-record" as referred to by Judge Beacham in his JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL, [Record, page 151, first paragraph] is not defined under G. R.
A. M. A. (Not in Record)
49. Judge Beacham erroneously found in his JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL, that Petitioner conceded that the subject "books and other
materials" petitioner sought, were in fact "contained in the collections of
libraries open to the public." (Record, page 150, last

paragraph)

50. Petitioner did not concede such facts [see V #49, immediately above]
as represented by Judge Beacham, and here asserts that the operative phrase of
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the section of G. R. A. M. A. Judge Beacham refers to is "contained in the
collections of libraries open to the public. (Not in Record)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT 1.

Petitioner argues that the District Court below did not properly

apply the appropriate standard of review for a MOTION TO DISMISS.
The Court below did not construe the facts alleged in the PETITION, as
true, and in a light most favorable to the Petitioner.
The District Court below misconstrued Petitioner's facts alleged,
and even misrepresents, in its JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, the actual
facts Petitioner alleged.
Petitioner also argues the public's right to access.

POINT 2.

Petitioner argues that there is not a definition of "non-record"

contained in G. R. A. M. A., nor does the statute even contemplate any
items or categories classified as "non-records."

POINT 3.

Petitioner argues that the District Court below improperly

applied U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) to the facts of this case and stands
U. C. A §63-2-103(18)(a) on its head.

POINT 4.

Petitioner argues that he or any other individual participating in

their self-represented governmental scheme, cannot be compelled or
obligated to travel beyond the boundaries of his county, or to foreign
lands, in order to exercise his rights to access to public documents and
participate in his government. Particularly where his local government
possess the very documents and records he seeks to inspect.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS
MOTION TO DISMISS? IN OTHER WORDS, WAS PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A. REQUEST
DENIALS FATALLY FLAWED?
"If the government is given the unfettered discretion to decide what
information to make available to the press and public, it has the power to
distort the information and hide the truth. The first amendment guarantees of
free speech and free press protect our right to freely criticize the government
without fear of censorship by the government. But censorship in speaking and
publishing is not the only form of censorship that must be prevented. The
process of filtering information—selectively releasing some information while
withholding other information—can be effectively used to prevent criticism and
hide mistakes. The first amendment guarantees apply to both forms of
censorship/' Soc'u of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor. 616F.Supp.
569, 576 (D.Utah 1985). cited in Society of Professional Journalists v. Briaas et
iL, 675 F. Supp 1308, 1309 (D.Utah 1987)
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That same Court agreed and held "that there is a constitutional right
of access to public documents. n let
In Richmond Newspapers. Inc. v. Virginia. Justice Stevens noted that
"the core of the First Amendment is access to information about the
operation and functioning of government." 448 U.S. 555, 583-84, 100 S.Ct
2814, 2830-31, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), cited in Societu of Professional
Journalists v. Briaas et al. Id.
In 1986, the Utah Legislature enacted the Archives and Records Service
Act and in 1991, redefined and recodified it as the Government Records
Access and Management Act (G. R. A. M. A,). Enacting the Archives Act, the
Legislature articulated and memorialized the following public policy:
In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two
fundamental constitutional rights: (a) the right of privacy in
relation to personal data gathered by state agencies, and
(b) the public's right of access to information concerning
the conduct of the public's business*
Petitioner asserts it is axiomatic that he has a constitutional right of
access to public documents.
In reviewing the dismissal of Petitioner's action, the Court must view
the PETITION and all reasonable inferences in his favor, see Mounteer v.
Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) In addition, Dismissal is
only appropriate when it appears to a certainty that the Petitioner would
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of his claims, see Freeaard v. First W. Nat'l Bank. 738P.2d 614, 616
(Utah 1987)

In ruling on Respondent's MOTION TO DISMISS, the Court below
observed, "With respect to the merits of respondent's Motion to Dismiss, the
Court first notes that respondent has not raised issues concerning the formal
adequacy of the Petition or with respect to petitioner's compliance with
required administrative procedures. While it appears to the Court that the
Petition may not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 and it is
not clear from the file whether petitioner in fact exhausted his administrative
remedies, ..." It is clear by the Courts' remarks regarding Petitioner's
administrative remedies or his pursuit of those avenues for redress, the Court
below did not take cognitive recognition of Petitioner's statement of facts.
Petitioner clearly alleged with a verified PETITION that he administratively
attempted to personally inspect public records in the Washington County
attorneys' possession, then filed a written request under Washington Countys'
Ordinance #529 (G. R. A. M. A.), and then pursued his administrative appeal,
which was denied him by way of non-response.
Petitioner understands that the Court below asserts that its decision was
not controlled or affected by its erroneous observation of Petitioner's statement
of facts, however, Petitioner makes the point that the Court below clearly
demonstrated its own error and inattention to Petitioner's stated facts, which
the Court was obligated to construe as true. Instead, the Court below
indicated that it was not clear as to whether Petitioner had exhausted his
administrative remedies or whether he had complied with the appeal process
under G. R. A. M. A. This demonstrates shear lack of attention to this case
and Petitioner's verified statement of facts.
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The Court below indicates that it decided this case as a matter of law,
pursuant to G. R. A. M. A. The Court first observes Petitioner's use of the
term "public documents," and claims such term is not "defined in GRAMA
[sic]" The Court below clearly misinterprets the plain language of the
statute.
G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(a) defines "Record" to mean all
"books, letters, documents. [etc.T Therefore, a "document" is a "record" and
Petitioner's use of the word "document" is no different than if he were to use
the word "record." The words "document" and "record" are synonymous.
G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(17) defines "public record" to
mean "a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that is not
exempt from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b).
[Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b) is not applicable in this particular case.] Therefore,
the logical conclusion may be inferred that Petitioner's use of the term
"public document" is circumscribed within the language of G. R. A. M. A. In
addition U. C. A. §63-2-201(2) also states that, "All records are public unless
otherwise expressly provided by statute."
The Court below then goes on to recognize that Petitioner did in fact
use the word "record." OH MY GOSH! But then it simply passes on to its
next misconstruance and misapplication of G. R. A. M. A.
The Court below observed that, "Paragraph 32 of the Petition specifies,
however, that 4the records sought to be inspected' are in fact specifically
named books 'and any other reference material, book, or periodical'
maintained in the Washington County Attorney's law library, the fatal flaw
in the Petition is that such books are not records to which GRAMA applies."

G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2~103(18)(a) defines "Record" to mean all
"books, [etc.r The Court below merely passed over that applicable portion of
the statute to misapply an inapplicable section to Petitioner's cause of action.
The Court below stated, "GRAMA clearly provides that the term 'record' as used
in GRAMA does not refer to
books and other materials that are cataloged, indexed, or
inventoried and contained in the collections of libraries
open to the public, regardless of physical form or
characteristics of the material.
U.CA § 63-2-103(18)(b)(vi)"

In a paramount effort to construe the statute in light least favorable to
the Petitioner, the Court below continued with the following erroneous
observation. "Respondent asserts, petitioner appears to concede, and the
Court takes notice of the fact that the "books and other materials" identified
by petitioner as the subject of his Petition are in fact "contained in the
collections of libraries open to the public/ Petitioner conceded no such thing!
The Court goes on in an attempt to elucidate, but in actuality it muddies its
findings and further casts aspersion on the intent of the Legislature for open
access of public records maintained by the Washington County Attorney.
At this point the Petitioner must go to extraordinary lengths to analyze
the Courts' error and the misapplication of its conclusion to the facts of this
case.
The operative phrase of the section of the statute the Court below
references is, "contained in the collections of libraries open to the public,"
Petitioner will repeat this for emphasis, "libraries open to the public," The
PETITION clearly alleges a new partition and locked doors now stand between
the Petitioner and the records he seeks access to. Such facts clearly
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demonstrate a lack of access, and would be reasonably construed as not
being open to the public! The moment the Law Library housed at the
Washington County Attorney's office, was closed to free and open access by
the public, and remained closed even after request for access was made by
the Petitioner, such library no longer could be classified as public, and G. R.
A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi}9 referred to by the Court below, was
not applicable to bar Petitioner's redress through his PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW, or grant the remedy sought by Respondent's MOTION TO
DISMISS, "as a matter of law/ As a matter of law, the Court below did err.
The Washington County Attorney is the custodian of "public records"
which he is denying access to by the public, and in contemptuous violation
of G. R. A. M. A.

POINT 2. DOES THE UTAH GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS AND
MANAGEMENT ACT. U.C.A. §63-2-101 ETSEQ, IDENTIFY,
DEFINE, OR EVEN CONTEMPLATE "NON-RECORDS?"
Petitioner contends that the answer to this question is an absolute
"No!" Respondent and the Court stretch far afield to liberally construe G.
R. A. M. A. to define "non-record."
The scheme under which G. R. A. M. A. operates suggests a posture of
openness and unrestrained (free) access. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2301(3) clearly states "The list of public records in this section is not
exhaustive and should not be used to limit access to records.

The concept postulated by the Respondent and the Court below,
suggesting that G. R. A. M. A. defines those records sought by the Petitioner as
"non-records" is not merely novel, it is outright preposterous, and suggests
mental imbalance and a retreat from reason, logic, and common sense. It is
clear that as students of the law, those individuals representing the
Respondent and the Court below fully understand the ramifications of the
court decisions heretofore cited by the Petitioner, which declare axiomatically
his constitutional right to access to public "documents/
As pointed out in Petitioner's POINT 1 above, the Court below nitpicks at
Petitioner's frequent use of the word "document" in his pleadings, instead of
the Courts' more favored term "record." In the Briags case, J. Green favored
the word "document." OH MY GOSH! Isn't that what the Petitioner used?
In either case, the Utah Legislature did not appear so fastidious, it
merely expressed a broader intent by articulating "the public's right of access to
information concerning the conduct of the public's business." ML
The Respondents' intent is clearly to deprive the Petitioner his
constitutional right of access to information regarding his governments'
business, which intent is evidently supported by the Court below. Is shark
courtesy factored in here somewhere?
There are but four (4) definitions of records found in G. R. A. M. A., and
none of them identify with "non-records."
The clear and plain language of the statute belies the Courts' ruling that
G. R. A. M. A. defines "non-record." Using the Courts' power of reasoning, to
define an animal that was not a horse the dialog would go something like this.
Dummy claims he saw a "horse." Dummy can't have seen a horse, it
was actually not a horse because Farmer John defines what Dummy saw as
Court of Appeals Case No. 9600P1 H A _
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horses, equine animals, saddled creatures used
for riding, and other four legged mammals characterized
by hooves, pointy ears, manes, and long flowing tails
with horse hair, that are cataloged, itemized,
characterized and otherwise crossbred with jackasses.
Therefore, what Dummy saw was a "non-horse.".

What the statute, referred to by the Court below is actually saying, is
that those documents that might be sought, pursuant to G. R. A. M. A.,
from a government entity that is a public library, are not available through
G. R. A. M. A. because a library that is "open to the public," means exactly
that — OPEN TO THE PUBLIC! A request pursuant to G. R. A. M. A. made
to a public library is as preposterous as the Courts' explanation that the
"records" Petitioner seeks are actually "non-records." Such a request to a
public library is unnecessary. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi),
is intended to lend reason, logic, and common sense to an otherwise stupid
bureaucrat. It is not for the use the Court below has put it to.

POINT 3. DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY APPLY U. C. A. §63-2103(18)(b)(vi) TO PETITIONER'S CASE?
Petitioner has heretofore argued that the operative phrase that the
Court below improperly applies is "libraries open to the public." Petitioner's
argument in that regard was more fully expressed in POINT 2 above,
however, Petitioner would vigorously argue that the Court below improperly
applied U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) to his case, and Respondents' MOTION
TO DISMISS should have been denied.

The Court below reasons that "The Utah Legislature has made the access
provisions of GRAMA inapplicable to the books and materials in the law library
of the Washington County Attorney because those books and materials are
available in public libraries." The Court below errs in this reasoning, which is
also tied to Petitioner's argument found in the following POINT 4.
If Washington County had a public library which housed the documents,
records, or whatever term you want to use to describe the information
regarding the conduct of the public's business, then the reasoning of the Court
below might be considered, however, that reasoning is even faulty.
Petitioner did not pursue his requests, under G. R. A. M. A., to a public
library. His requests were specifically directed to a governmental entity
(Washington County Attorney) that had purposely closed access to the public
records (documents) it houses and maintains. In this regard, the Courts
reasoning is faulty.
Even considering the scenario suggested by the Court below, that
GRAMA is inapplicable to the documents in the law library at the County
Attorneys' office because those books and materials are available in public
libraries, such reasoning does not comport with the intent of G. R. A. M. A.,
the Utah Legislature, and the various appellate court decisions on the subject.
Differences might be found, that are essential to the knowledge obtained,
from otherwise identical documents (records) located in separate governmental
repositories. It is unreasonable and irresponsible for one (1) governmental
entity to point to another governmental entity and claim, "You can't have what
I have because they have it over there. You go get it from them."
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In this capacity, the Court below h a s seriously damaged the integrity
and purpose of G. R. A. M. A. Likewise, the Court below assumed facts not
in evidence, and failed to construe the facts alleged in Petitioner's verified
PETITION in a light most favorable to him.
This argument actually returns to Petitioner's POINT 1, challenging
the Courts' dismissal in favor of Respondents' MOTION TO DISMISS.

POINT 4. CAN PETITIONER BE EXPECTED OR OBLIGATED BY HIS
GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL BEYOND THE GEOGRAPHIC
BOUNDARIES OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH HE LIVES, IN
ORDER FOR HIM TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE RECORDS HE
SEEKS. IN OTHER WORDS, IS THERE AN ISSUE OF
CONVENIENCE AT PLAY TO DENY PETITIONER ACCESS TO
THE RECORDS HE SEEKS?
The Court below t u r n s against the Petitioner the issue of his
indigence. With inconceivable lack of common sense, the Court below
attempts to imbue Legislative intent into G. R. A. M. A. which is not there.
The issue of inconvenience rises with the Respondent, not the Petitioner as
the Court below attempts to portray.
The Respondent h a s persistently clouded Petitioner's G. R. A. M. A.
Requests with a plethora of excuses, which mostly whine about
convenience, or lack of it.
We don't have the staff.
We don't have the facility.

We are troubled with theft.
We are troubled with threats of terrorism.
We don't have privacy any more.
We don't have the equipment.
You can go somewhere else to get what you want. (ie. Nevada)
Petitioner has not yet been afforded the ability to discover whether
Respondents' whining over convenience, as indicated above, is valid, and he
does not represent Respondents' excuses in this APPELLANTS BRIEF to grant
any degree of validity to them.
The decision of the Court below, regarding convenience, ties itself back to
its misapplication of G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi), which
Petitioner has heretofore demonstrated to be in error.
It does not matter one way or the other that the Legislature did not
provide an indigence exception or an inconvenience exception to the statutory
exclusions the Court below claims. It is clear, however, that the Court below
was influenced in its decision by its own faulty reasoning.

CONCLUSION
It is clear and evident that Respondent chooses not to comply with
Petitioner's Constitutional right to access to public documents. Prior appellate
courts, both state and federal, have made the right axiomatic. This court must
review the decision of the Court below in a light most favorable to the
Petitioner and reverse its decision to dismiss Petitioner's claims.

WHEREFORE: Petitioner prays for relief in the following:
1.

Reverse the decision of the District Court below.

2.

Remand the case back to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this Court's opinion, granting the Petitioner access to
the public documents housed at the Washington County Attorneys'
Office.

3.

Award costs and fees to the Petitioner, on appeal.

4.

Award any other remedies this Court deems just and appropriate.

DATED THIS 6th day of May, 1996.

Joseph M. WiSden
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH M. WISD£N,

J
Petitioner,

}

vs,

)

WASHINGTON COUNTY,

J
Respondent.

}

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

Civil No. 950501367 AA

This matter was commenced by the filing of

a "Petition for Review of

G.R, A.fVLA. Request Denials" which was served on Washington County on September
12, 1395. A Default Certificate was fitaJ October 3, 1995. On the previous day,
however, October 2, 1995, counsel for Washington County had served by maJI a
Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum in response to the Petition.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an "Opposition" to the Motion together with petitioner's
Motion for Summary Judgment On October 23, 1995, petitioner save notice to
submit both the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Summary Judgment to the
Court for decision.
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE
Petitioner's "Opposition": Motion for Summary Judgment and Notices to
Submit all recite that "Respondent is in default" so that *no service is required", citing
Rule 55 (8H2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Porakrr*. That assertion is factually and
legally incorrect. Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required respondent to

*
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"serve" Its response en or before October'2, 1995.

U R . C P , Rule 5(b) allowed

respondent to serve its response to the Petition by mailing it to petitioner at hie known
address. Respondent served its Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum by
mail on October 10,1996, The rules 4Q not require that response to be filed with the
Clerk within twenty days, but only that the response be "served/

Consequently,

although respondent's Motion md Memorandum did not appear in the Court's file ort
October 3, respondent was in fact not in default. The Court considers this fact to
constitute good cause to set aside the entry of default and does hereby set aside the
entry of default made on October 3* See Rule 55|c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Petitioner's: Motion for Summery Judgment faffs to meet the requirements of
U.R.C.P. Rule 56 and of Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration in several
respects including, without (imitation, improper and incomplete form, the absence of
supporting affidavits, end petitioner's failure to serve the Motion upon respondent
{With respect to the Jest stated defect, petitioner's repeated assertion that service
upon respondent was not required, M o w e d by petitioner's filing of Notices to Submit
which recite that respondent has not filed any opposing memorandum or pleading, is
at least disingenuous.} These defects in petitioner's Motion are sufficient ground for
the Court to deny the Motion. In addition, however, the Court finds as a matter of
law that petitioner is not emitted to the relief prayed for in petitioner's Motion, as
explained below. On these bases, petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied.
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RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
In response to respondent's Motion to Dismiss, petitioner asserts thai
respondent** Motion dots not constitute a proper response to the Petition and thai
the Motion fails to meat the requirements of Hula 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. These assertions are legally incorrect. With respect to the facts of the
case* respondent's Memorandum recites only petitioner's own a Negations, without
controverting or adding to the facts alleged, After making its argument, respondent's
Memorandum concludes thai the Petition should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Respondent's Motion Is clearly a Rule 12tbH6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Respondent's failure to recite "Rule 12*
does not change the clear subsume* of the Motion, Petitioner further asserts that
respondent's Motion to dismiss is not art "ANSWER later to the Petra'ort* This
assertion may be factually correct, but it is legally irrelevant.

Under Rufe 12,

respondent was required to make this Motion "before pleading." The Court finds that
[petitioner's "Opposition* to respondent's Motion to Dismiss raises no legitimate issues
of fact or law.
With respect to the merits of respondent's Motion to Dismiss, ^he Court first
notes that respondeat has not raised issues concerning the formal adequacy of the
Petition or with respect to petitioner's compliance with required administrative
procedures. While it appears to the Court that the Petition may not meet fta
requirements of Utah Code Ann. 163*2-404 and it m not clear from the file whether
petitioner m fact exhausted his administrative remedies* those issues were not raised
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by respondent end die not affect or control the Court's decision.
This matter cam be decided as a matter of (aw, however, on the basis of the
Government Records Access and Management Act, U.C.A. S 63-2*101 et s&q,
{"GRAMA*!. The Court first notes that the Petition repeatedly uses the term "public
documents'** which is not defined in GRAMA, Paragraph 32 of the Petition specifies,
however, that "the records sought to be inspected" ere in fact specifically named
books "and any other reference materiel, book, or periodical" maintained In the
Washington County Attorney's law library. The fata! ffaw in the Petition is thmi sweh
books are not records to which (SRAMA applies. GRAMA clearly provides that the
term "record* ee ueed in GRAMA doee not refer to
books and other materials that ^r& catalogued, indexed, Of
inventoried and contained in the collections of libraries open
to the public, regardless of physical form or characteristics
of the material*
UX.A. S63-2»103i18HbHvO.
Respondent asserts, petitioner appears to concede, end the Court takes notice
of the fact that the "books and other materials" identifiedfoypetitioner as the subject
of hi* Petition are m fact "'contained in the collections of libraries open to the pyblic,1T
Consequently* the copies of sue!*, books and materials which are m the Washington
County Attorney's law library are not subject to GRAMA because they are specifically
excluded from the definition of "records", Le., those documents whlth are subject to
GRAMA.

The Utah Legislature has made the access provisions of GRA&IA

inapplicable to the books and materials in the law library of the Washington County
Attorney because those books and materials are available sn pubic libraries.
ENDUM #1
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Petitioner crtes U>CA. § 63-2-201 i3)M for the proposition that a "public
record" Is a record that is not private, controlled or protected and that is not exempt
from disclosure. Regardless of whether petitioner's Interpretation of this statute is
correct, it is irrelevant. The statute cited by petitioner identifies "records" which "are
not public/ The books and materials sought by petitioner are not "records'* at afl
under GRAMA and* therefore, could not be "public records.*
Petitioner seems to assert that the public libraries housing the books and
materials which he seeks are not conveniently located and that, due to his claimed
indigence, he cannot reasonably be expected to travel to any library location other
than the Washington County Attorney's law library. The Legislature did not provide
that a petitionee's simple assertion of inconvenience {i.e., that public libraries are not
convenient to a particular petitioner) would eliminate the statutory exclusion of such
books and materials from the definrtkm of the term "record"* so that those books and
materials would ihtn be subject to GRAMA. In other words, the Legislature did not
provide an indigence exception or an inconvenience exception to the statutory
exclusion of those books and materials from the scope of OR AM A,
Petitioner further asserts that past public use of the Washington County
Attorney's law library "has established a tradftbn of open public access/' Petitioner
cites no authority supporting a right of access based on "tradition", however* and
<3RAMA contains no "tradition" exception to the exclusions from Its $zop&.
Consequently, the Court finds that the Petition fails to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, The Petition is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the
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merits. The Court specifically reserves smy question regarding respondent's
entrtiement to attorney's fees and costs in this matter*
DATED this

day of November, 1985.
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G, RAND 8EACHAM
Fifth District Court Judge

J hereby certify that on this

/3t

d*y of Jjfa

, 199S, i mailed a

true and correct copy of the above and foregoing, first-class postage prepaid, to the
following:

Joseph M. Wisden
465 South Bluff Street #160
St. George, U? 84770

Robert R, Wallace, Esq.
Hanson, Epperson & Smith, P.C.
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0- Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
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